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Abstract
Gerrymandering is a practice of manipulating district boundaries and locations in order to achieve a political
advantage for a particular party. Lewenberg, Lev, and Rosenschein [AAMAS 2017] initiated the algorithmic
study of a geographically-based manipulation problem, where voters must vote at the ballot box closest to them.
In this variant of gerrymandering, for a given set of possible locations of ballot boxes and known political pref-
erences of n voters, the task is to identify locations for k boxes out of m possible locations to guarantee victory
of a certain party in at least ` districts. Here integers k and ` are some selected parameter.
It is known that the problem isNP-complete already for 4 political parties and prior to our work only heuristic
algorithms for this problem were developed. We initiate the rigorous study of the gerrymandering problem from
the perspectives of parameterized and fine-grained complexity and provide asymptotically matching lower and
upper bounds on its computational complexity. We prove that the problem is W[1]-hard parameterized by k + n
and that it does not admit an f(n, k)·mo(
√
k) algorithm for any function f of k and n only, unless the Exponential
Time Hypothesis (ETH) fails. Our lower bounds hold already for 2 parties. On the other hand, we give an
algorithm that solves the problem for a constant number of parties in time (m+ n)O(
√
k).
1 Introduction
In 1812, Massachusetts governor Elbridge Gerry immortalized his name by signing a bill that created a mytho-
logical salamander shaped district in the Boston area to the benefit of his political party. Since then the term
gerrymandering has been used for the practice of establishing a political advantage by manipulating voting district
boundaries. Wikipedia article Gerrymandering contains a lot of notable gerrymandering examples in electoral
systems of many countries. One of possible responses of such manipulations is a more “rational” definition of
voting districts, for example the system where voters should always go to a ballot box (or central area) that is
closest to them [19].
However, even in the “rational” geographical settings manipulations are still possible. [15] considered the
variant of the gerrymandering problem in which the agent in charge of the design of voting districts has to follow
a clear rule: all voters vote in the ballot box nearest to them. As it was shown by [15], even with clear and rational
rules, manipulation is possible. This brought Lewenberg et al. to the following natural question. Is there an
efficient algorithmic procedure that would allow an agent, who is obliged to follow the rules, to optimize division
for his personal preferred outcome? The good news here is that the existence of such a procedure is highly unlikely,
because as it was shown in [15], the problem is NP-complete already for 4 political parties.
On the other hand, when the number of districts k is small, the problem is trivially solvable in time mknO(1),
where m is the number of all possible locations of ballot boxes and n is the number of voters, by a brute-force
enumerating all possible locations for k boxes. Thus in the situation when the number of districts is small, there is
an efficient procedure for finding an optimal manipulation. This immediately brings us to the following question
which serves as the departure point of our work.
Question 1. Is it possible to solve the gerrymandering problem faster than the brute-force?
To answer this question, we study GERRYMANDERING through the lens of Parameterized Complexity, which
is a multivariate paradigm of algorithm analysis introduced by [7]. In Parameterized Complexity, one measures the
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performance of algorithms not merely in terms of the size of the input, but also with respect to certain properties
of the input or the output (captured by one or several numerical parameters, k). This gives rise to two notions of
tractability, both of which correspond to polynomial-time tractability in the classical setting, when the parameter
is constant. First is the class FPT that contains all problems that can be solved in time f(k) · nO(1) (for some
computable function f ), while the (asymptotically less efficient) class XP contains all problems that can be solved
in time nf(k). Aside from these complexity classes, we will make use of the complexity class W[1], the class
of parameterized problems that can be in time f(k) · nO(1) reduced to INDEPENDENT SET parameterized by the
solution size. FPT 6=W[1] is the working hypothesis of Parameterized Complexity and it is widely believed that
no W[1]-hard problem is in FPT. Finally, our more fine-grained lower bound result depends on the Exponential
Time Hypothesis (ETH) [13, 16], which states that the satisfiability of k-CNF formulas (for k ≥ 3) is not solvable
in subexponential-time 2o(n), where n is the number of variables in the formula. We refer to the recent books [4]
and [8] for more exposition on these complexity notions.
Contribution [15] proved that GERRYMANDERINGplurality (the Gerrymandering problem when the winner at
each district is decided by plurality voting rule) is NP-complete, even when the number of candidates |C| is 4.
We enhance this intractability result by providing a fine-grained complexity of the problem. Also note that our
reduction also implies that the problem is NP-complete for any number |C| ≥ 2 of candidates.
Theorem 1. For any number |C| ≥ 2 of candidates, GERRYMANDERINGplurality is W[1]-hard parameterized
by k + n. Moreover, there is no algorithm solving GERRYMANDERINGplurality in time f(k, n) ·mo(
√
k) for any
computable function f , unless ETH fails.
The tools we used to obtain lower bounds are based on the grid-tiling technique of [17]. We refer to the book
of [4] for further discussions of subexponential algorithms.
Interestingly, the ETH lower bound from Theorem 1 is asymptotically tight. We give an algorithm whose
running time matches our lower bound.
Theorem 2. For any constant number of candidates and for any voting rule g, GERRYMANDERINGg is solvable
in time (m+ n)O(
√
k).
To obtain our algorithm, we use the machinery developed by [18]. The main idea is to guess roughly
√
k many
ballot boxes from an optimal solution that separate the plane into two parts such that each part contains between
k/3 and 2k/3 ballot boxes of the solution.
Related work The GERRYMANDERING problem was introduced by [15]. It is an example of general control
problem, where a central agent may influence the outcome using its power over the voting process [1, 2, 9, 12, 14].
The problem also belongs to the large family of voting manipulation problems, whose computational aspects
are widely studied in the computational social choice community, see [3, 10, 11, 20] for further references. In
particular, parameterized complexity of manipulation was studied in [5, 6].
2 Preliminaries
For an integer i, we let [i] = {1, 2, . . . , i}. We denote by N the set of natural numbers and by R the set of real
numbers. Given two points p1 = (x1, y1), p2 = (x2, y2) in the plane R2, the distance between p1 and p2 is
dist(p1, p2) =
√
(x2 − x1)2 + (y2 − y1)2.
2.1 Voting and GERRYMANDERING
Given a set of voters V = {v1, . . . , vn} and a set of candidates C, the preference ranking of voter vi is a total
order (i.e., transitive, complete, reflexive, and antisymmetric relation) i over C. The interpretation of c1 i c2 is
that the voter vi strictly prefers candidate c1 over candidate c2. We denote by pi(C) the set of preference rankings
for the set of candidate C. A voting rule is then a function f : pi(C)n → C. An election Ef = (C, V ) is
then comprised of a set of voters V , a set of candidates C, a preference ranking i over C for each voter and a
voting rule f . In this paper, we will only consider voting rules that do not distinguish between voters. That is the
outcome of the voting rule only depends on the number of voters with each preference ranking and not their order.
An example of such rule is plurality, in which for each voter only the topmost candidate counts and the winner is
the candidate that got the most votes.
2
In a district-based election Ef,g voters are divided into disjoint sets V1, . . . , Vs such that
⋃
i∈[s] Vi = V . These
sets define elections E if = (C, Vi, ). The ultimate winner from amongst the winners of E if is determined by voting
rule g, which for us will be a threshold function.
Definition 1 (GERRYMANDERING [15]). The input of the GERRYMANDERINGf problem is:
• A set of candidates C.
• A set of n voters V = {v1, . . . , vn} ⊂ R2, where every voter vi ∈ V is identified by their location on the
plane, and a preferred ranking i∈ pi(C).1
• A set of m possible ballot boxes B = {b1, . . . , bm} ⊂ R2.
• Parameters `, k ∈ N, such that ` ≤ k ≤ m.
• A target candidate p ∈ C.
The task is to decide whether there is a subset of k ballot boxes B′ ⊆ B, such that they define a district-based
election, in which every voter votes at their closest ballot box in B′, the winner at every ballot box is determined
by voting rule f , and p wins in at least ` ballot boxes.
We assume that there are no two possible ballot boxes and a voter such that the voter is equidistant from the
two boxes, meaning that no voter could ever be exactly on the boundary between two districts and so a fixed set
of ballot boxes unambiguously defines the partition of voters into districts.
In Figure 1, we give an example of an input of GERRYMANDERINGg and two possible solutions.
Figure 1: The example of [15]. The green circle and red cross are voters voting for a different candidates. The
squares are ballot boxes. In the bottom are two examples with 3 ballot boxes opened giving a different outcome.
2.2 Voronoi diagrams
To describe our algorithm, we require the notion of a Voronoi diagram. For a finite set of points P on the plane,
the Voronoi region of a point p ∈ P is the set of those points of the plane that are closer to p than to any other point
in P . We may also use the Voronoi cell as a synonym. A Voronoi region is convex and its boundary is a polyline
consisting of segments and possibly infinite rays, since the Voronoi region of p ∈ P is essentially the intersection
of |P | − 1 half-planes. The Voronoi diagram of P is the tuple of the Voronoi regions of all the elements of P .
The Voronoi diagram could be considered a planar graph. The faces of the graph correspond to the Voronoi
regions, the edges correspond to the segments which form the boundaries of the individual regions, and the vertices
are the endpoints of these segments. The technical details of this correspondence can be found in [18].
Voronoi diagrams appear naturally in GERRYMANDERING problem, since when the set S of ballot boxes
chosen is fixed, the Voronoi diagram of S defines exactly which regions of the plane are assigned to vote in a
particular ballot box.
3 Hardness
To obtain our ETH lower bound and prove W[1]-hardness of GERRYMANDERING, we reduce from the following
W[1]-hard problem.
Definition 2 (GRID TILLING [17]). The input of the GRID TILING problem is:
1Lewenberg et al. [15] also define the weighted problem, where every voter v has weight wv . We focus on the version without weights.
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• Integers k, n ∈ N, and a collection S of k2 nonempty sets Si,j ⊆ [n]× [n](1 ≤ i, j ≤ k).
The task is to decide whether there is a set of pairs si,j ∈ Si,j , for each 1 ≤ i, j ≤ k, such that:
• If si,j = (p, q) and si+1,j = (p′, q′), then p = p′.
• If si,j = (p, q) and si,j+1 = (p′, q′), then q = q′.
Lemma 1 ([17], see also Theorem 14.28 in [4]). GRID TILING is W[1]-hard parameterized by k and, unless ETH
fails, it has no f(k)no(k)-time algorithm for any computable function f .
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Figure 2: Example of a hardness reduction from Grid Tiling for n = 3 and k = 2. The sets are
S1,1 = {(1, 1), (2, 2), (3, 3)}, S1,2 = {(1, 3), (2, 1), (2, 3), (3, 2)}, S2,1 = {(1, 2), (2, 1), (3, 2)}, and S2,2 =
{(1, 2), (3, 1)}. The voters are denoted by ×, where our candidate is red and the other candidate is blue. The
multiplicity of red voters in each cell is 1 more than the sum of the blue voters in the same cell. The ballot boxes
are depicted as •. A solution to an instance is the set of red ballot boxes.
Overview of the Proof. Before we give a formal proof of Theorem 1, we first give an informal description of our
reduction from GRID TILING problem that excludes some tedious computations that are necessary for the proof
to work, but are not important for understanding where the difficulty of the problem lies. The main idea is to put
all voters and ballot boxes inside large k × k grid such that the cell (i, j) of this grid correspond to the set Si,j .
In the center of each cell is one much smaller n × n grid corresponding to the set Si,j (see Figure 2). The ballot
boxes are placed on appropriate positions inside small grid, with a small catch – for two neighboring cells of large
grid, the small grids are “mirrored”. This way, if we select precisely the same pair (p, q) for each set Si,j , then the
voters inside each large cell vote in the ballot box inside the same cell.
We will place a number of the “other candidate” voters, determined by a calculation later in the proof, very
close to the center of each of 4 borders of the cell (see Figure 2). By selecting the right distances, for the size of
the large grid, size of the small grid, and distance of the “other candidate” voters to the border of the cell, we can
force that if we select ballot boxes corresponding to si,j = (p, q) ∈ Si,j and si+1,j = (p′, q′) ∈ Si+1,j (resp.
si,j+1 = (p
′, q′) ∈ Si,j+1), then the voters near the border between cells corresponding to Si,j and Si+1,j (resp.
Si,j+1) vote inside their corresponding cells if and only if p = p′ (resp. q = q′).
Finally, we place in the center of each large cell the number of the “our candidate” voters that is just 1 larger
than the number of the “other candidate” voters inside the cell. As we placed “our candidate” voters on k2
4
different positions, to win k2 ballot boxes, in each box in a solution has to vote all voters from precisely one of
these positions. Furthermore, by selecting the number of voters in each cell to grow exponentially, we get that the
only way to win all ballot boxes is if all voters in the same cell vote in the same ballot box. This is only possible
if we choose in each cell precisely one ballot box and if the corresponding selection of pairs in Si,j’s is actually a
solution to the original GRID TILING instance.
In the remaining of the section we formalize above intuition by assigning the voters and ballot boxes specific
positions in the plane and computing distances between positions of ballot boxes and “other candidate” voters.
Theorem 1. For any number |C| ≥ 2 of candidates, GERRYMANDERINGplurality is W[1]-hard parameterized
by k + n. Moreover, there is no algorithm solving GERRYMANDERINGplurality in time f(k, n) ·mo(
√
k) for any
computable function f , unless ETH fails.
Proof. We will prove the theorem by a reduction from GRID TILING. Let k, n ∈ N be integers and S be a collec-
tion of k2 nonempty sets Si,j ⊆ [n]×[n](1 ≤ i, j ≤ k). We will construct an instance I = (C, V,B, k2, k2, “red”)
of GERRYMANDERINGplurality with two candidates “red” and “blue”, 2O(k
2) voters and O(k2n2) ballot boxes
and all voters and boxes positioned at the integral points inside [O(k · n2)]× [O(k · n2)] grid.
Ballot boxes. Let (p, q) ∈ Si,j , we let xi,j(p,q) = (10n2 + 4n)(i − 1) + 5n2 + 4p if i is even and xi,j(p,q) =
(10n2 + 4n)(i− 1) + 5n2 + 4(n− p) if i is odd. Similarly, we let yi,j(p,q) = (10n2 + 4n)(j − 1) + 5n2 + 4q if j is
even and yi,j(p,q) = (10n
2 + 4n)(j − 1) + 5n2 + 4(n− q) if j is odd. We then identify the pair (p, q) ∈ Si,j with a
ballot box bi,j(p,q) = (x
i,j
(p,q), y
i,j
(p,q)). Finally, we will denote by Bi,j the set of ballot boxes associated with pairs in
Si,j .
Voters. For each pair of 1 ≤ i, j ≤ k we will place 5(i−1)·k+(j−1) “blue” voters at each of the following four
positions: ((10n2+4n)(i−1)+1, (10n2+4n)(j−1)+5n2+2n), ((10n2+4n)(i−1)+5n2+2n, (10n2+4n)(j−
1)+1), ((10n2+4n)i−1, (10n2+4n)(j−1)+5n2+2n), and ((10n2+4n)(i−1)+5n2+2n, (10n2+4n)j−1).
We denote the sets of voters at the above four positions by V i,j← , V
i,j
↑ , V
i,j
→ , and V
i,j
↓ , respectively. And we will
place 4 ·5(i−1)·k+(j−1)+1 “red” voters at the position ((10n2+4n)+5n2+2n, (10n2+4n)(j−1)+5n2+2n),
we denote the set of these voters V i,jR .
The goal is to assign k2 ballot boxes such that in each ballot box “red” has majority.
Correctness. We will show that (k, n, S) is a YES-instance of GRID TILLING if and only if (C, V , B, k2,
k2, “red”) is a YES-instance of GERRYMANDERINGplurality . Let si,j be a pair in Si,j for all i, j ∈ [k] and let
B′ = {bi,jsi,j | i, j ∈ [k]}. The following two claims show that if
⋃
i,j∈[k]{si,j} is a solution to GRID TILLING,
then B′ is a solution to GERRYMANDERINGplurality . Moreover, if B′ is a solution such that for all i, j ∈ [k] the
voters in
⋃
∈{R,←,→,↑,↓} vote in b
i,j
si,j
, then
⋃
i,j∈[k]{si,j} is a solution to GRID TILLING.
5n2 − 14n− 4p4p
2n− 4q
4n− 4p′5n2 − 1
4q′
2
bi,j(p,q)
bi+1,j(p′,q′)
4q′ − 2nV i,j→
V i+1,j←
Figure 3: The situation in Claim 1. The distance dist(bi,j(p,q), V
i,j
→ ) =
√
(5n2 + 4n− 4p− 1)2 + (2n− 4q)2.
Which is clearly between 5n2 + 4n − 4p − 1 and 5n2 + 4n − 4p. Similarly, dist(bi+1,j(p′,q′), V i+1,j→ ) is between
5n2 + 4n− 4p′ − 1 and 5n2 + 4n− 4p′.
Claim 1. Let bi,j(p,q) and b
i+1,j
(p′,q′) be two ballot boxes. Then for every voter v ∈ V i,j→ it holds dist(v, bi,j(p,q)) <
dist(v, bi+1,j(p′,q′)) if and only if p ≤ p′. Similarly, for every v′ ∈ V i+1,j← it holds dist(v′, bi+1,j(p′,q′)) < dist(v′, bi,j(p,q)) if
and only if p ≥ p′.
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Proof. Let us assume that both i and j are even. The remaining 3 cases are analogous. Then bi,j(p,q) is at po-
sition ((10n2 + 4n)(i − 1) + 5n2 + 4p, (10n2 + 4n)(j − 1) + 5n2 + 4q) and bi+1,j(p′,q′) is at position ((10n2 +
4n)i+ 5n2 + 4(n− p′), (10n2 + 4n)(j − 1) + 5n2 + 4q′). Moreover, voters in V i,j→ and V i+1,j← are at positions(
(10n2 + 4n)i− 1, (10n2 + 4n)(j − 1) + 5n2 + 2n) and ((10n2 + 4n)i+ 1, (10n2 + 4n)(j − 1) + 5n2 + 2n),
respectively.
Since both q and q′ are numbers between 0 and n, it follows from Pythagorean theorem that the distance
between bi,j(p,q) and V
i,j
→ is between d
1
min = 5n
2 + 4n− 4p− 1 and d1max =
√
(d1min)
2 + (2n)2 < d1min + 1 (see
Figure 3). For the same reasoning, the distance between bi,j(p,q) and V
i+1,j
← is between d
1
min + 2 and d
1
min + 3, the
distance between bi+1,j(p′,q′) and V
i+1,j
← is between d
2
min = 5n
2 + 4n− 4p′− 1 and d2min + 1, and finally the distance
between bi+1,j(p′,q′) and V
i,j
→ is between d
2
min+2 and d
2
min+3. It follows that whenever p > p
′, then d2min+3 < d
1
min
and the voters in V i,j→ are closer to b
i+1,j
(p′,q′) than to b
i,j
(p,q). Similarly, if p < p
′ then d1min + 3 < d
2
min and the voters
in V i+1,j← are closer to b
i,j
(p,q) than to b
i+1,j
(p′,q′).
Repeating the same argument for ballot boxes bi,j(p,q) and b
i,j+1
(p′,q′), we obtain also the following claim.
Claim 2. Let bi,j(p,q) and b
i,j+1
(p′,q′) be two ballot boxes. Then for every voter v ∈ V i,j↓ it holds dist(v, bi,j(p,q)) <
dist(v, bi,j+1(p′,q′)) if and only if q ≤ q′. Similarly, for every v′ ∈ V i,j+1↑ it holds dist(v′, bi,j+1(p′,q′)) < dist(v′, bi,j(p,q)) if
and only if q ≥ q′.
From the above claims it directly follows that if we start with a YES-instance of GRID TILING, we end up
with a YES-instance of GERRYMANDERING.
For the reverse direction, it remains to show that any solution B′ to the reduced instance I of GERRYMAN-
DERING has to select exactly one ballot box bi,j(p,q) in each Bi,j and that for each such box, the set of voters voting
there is precisely the set of voters associated with (i, j).
First note that there are precisely k2 positions of “red” voters. Hence each ballot box in a solution has to
be closest to precisely one of these positions. Moreover, there are only k2 more “red” voters than “blue” voters.
Hence, if “red” wins in all boxes, then by pigeon-hole principle “red” has to win in each ballot box by precisely
1. Now let b ∈ B′ be a ballot box closest to V i,jR . Since V i,jR is precisely the set of “red” voters that vote in b,
none of voters in
⋃
∈{←,→,↑,↓} V
i′,j′
 such that (i
′ − 1)k + j′ − 1 > (i − 1)k + j − 1 can vote in b. Now the
number of the remaining “blue” voters is precisely 5 ·5(i−1)k+(j−1)−1 = 4 ·∑(i−1)k+(j−1)`=0 5`. Therefore, if one
group of voters among V i,j← , V
i,j
↑ , V
i,j
→ , and V
i,j
↓ does not vote at b, then “red” wins b by more than 1 vote and by
pigeon-hole principle, there will be a ballot box where “red” does not win. Finally, it is easy to see that if there is
more than one ballot box selected from Bi,j , then the box where V
i,j
R vote cannot take all four groups of voters
V i,j← , V
i,j
↑ , V
i,j
→ , and V
i,j
↓ . Therefore, it follows that in each Bi,j exactly one ballot box is selected in B
′ and the
set of voters in this ballot box is precisely the set of voters associated with (i, j). It follows from Claims 1 and 2
that the set of pairs associated with any such solution is a solution to GRID TILING.
4 Algorithm
Our algorithm uses the machinery developed by Marx and Pilipczuk [18] for guessing a balanced separator in the
Voronoi diagram of a potential solution. The main idea of our algorithm is as follows. The Voronoi diagram of
S could be viewed as a 3-regular planar graph with k faces and O(k) vertices. From [18] we know that for such
a graph there exists a polygon Γ which goes through O
(√
k
)
faces and vertices and there are at most 23k faces
strictly inside Γ and at most 23k faces strictly outside Γ. Moreover, Γ could be defined by the sequence ofO
(√
k
)
elements of B. This allows us to guess all possible variants of Γ without actually knowing the solution S, and for
each Γ we recurse into two smaller subproblems defined inside and outside of Γ. Since the separator Γ is balanced
and the recurrence T (k) = nO(
√
k)T ( 23k) solves to T (k) = n
O(
√
k), we obtain the desired time bound. See
Figure 4 for the illustration.
We assume that no four elements of B lie on the same circle. From this assumption, it follows that no vertex
of any Voronoi diagram corresponding to a possible solution has degree more than 3. We also assume that for any
four distinct points in B, one is never exactly the center of the unique circle passing through the three others. It
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Figure 4: The Voronoi diagram of a potential solution. The solution is represented by large squares, small squares
are the other possible ballot boxes. A separating polygon Γ is in red and dashed, the boxes on Γ are also in red.
Our algorithm guesses Γ, takes the red boxes in the solution and then solves the inside (blue and red squares) and
the outside (black and red squares) separately.
means that for any subset S of B, the vertices of the Voronoi diagram of S are disjoint from B. Both assumptions
are for the ease of presentation and could be achieved by a small perturbation of the coordinates.
Next we state the result of Marx and Pilipczuk about finding small balanced separators in Voronoi diagrams.
Lemma 2 ([18]). Let S be a set of k points on the plane. Consider the Voronoi diagram of S, and the planar
graph G associated with it. There is a polygon Γ which has length O
(√
k
)
and its vertices alternate between
elements of S and vertices of G and each segment of Γ lies inside a face of G. At most 23k faces lie strictly inside
Γ, and at most 23k strictly outside.
Note that since Γ passes through O
(√
k
)
faces, the number of faces which lie non-strictly inside (outside) Γ
is bounded by 34k when k is greater than γ, where γ is some constant.
Now we are ready to prove Theorem 2 which we restate for convenience.
Theorem 2. For any constant number of candidates and for any voting rule g, GERRYMANDERINGg is solvable
in time (m+ n)O(
√
k).
Proof. Our algorithm is a recursive brute-force search. An input to the recursion step is a particular state R = (V ,
B, `, k, F , v, ∆). A state consists of a set of voters V , a set of possible ballot boxes B, parameters `, k such that
` ≤ k ≤ |B|, a subset of boxes F ⊂ B, for any f ∈ F and σ ∈ pi(C) there is an integer v(f, σ) from 0 to |V |,
and a set of segments ∆, the segments form the boundary of the region containing V and B. Each segment δ ∈ ∆
has exactly one endpoint in F , and we denote this endpoint by δF . The algorithm returns whether the given state
is valid.
Definition 3 (Valid state). A state is valid if there exists a subset S ⊂ B \ F such that |S| + |F | = k, and in
the election with voters V and boxes S ∪ F the target party p wins in at least ` boxes of S, and for each f ∈ F
and σ ∈ pi(C) there are exactly v(f, σ) voters with preference list σ voting in box f . Additionally, in the Voronoi
diagram of S ∪ F , each segment δ of ∆ lies completely inside the cell (touching the border) corresponding to the
box δF .
If the state is valid, the algorithm also returns a particular subset S ⊂ B \ F satisfying Definition 3.
Intuitively, V and B correspond to a set of voters and possible boxes in the current subtask, F corresponds to
a set of boxes which we have already decided to take into the solution on the previous steps of the recursion, and
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for any box in F the number of voters with a particular preference list is also fixed through v. Among the boxes
of B \F we are supposed to select at most k− |F | to go into the solution, and in at least ` of them the target party
should win. The condition that segments of ∆ lie inside the corresponding cells enforces that these cells actually
separate the whole state from the outside of the region defined by ∆.
Initially, to run our algorithm having the input (C, V,B, `, k, p) to GERRYMANDERINGf , we proceed as fol-
lows. First, find an equilateral triangle T such that V and B are completely inside T . Then mirror each vertex
of the triangle against the opposing side, and denote the resulting set of three points as F . Consider the Voronoi
diagram of B ∪ F , by construction the outer faces are exactly the cells of F , and these faces are disjoint from B
and V . Construct a polygon ∆ in the following way. Start from a point of F and go to a next clockwise point
of F by a sequence of two segments having as the common point a vertex of the diagram on the border between
the corresponding outer faces; repeat until the polygon reaches the starting point again.The initial state is defined
as R0 = (V , B ∪ F , `, k + 3, F , v, ∆) where v(f, σ) = 0 for any f ∈ F and σ ∈ pi(C). Since for any
v ∈ V any b ∈ B is closer to v than any f ∈ F , R0 is valid if and only if (C, V,B, `, k, p) is a YES-instance of
GERRYMANDERINGf .
The recursive step. On the given state R = (V , B, `, k, F , v, ∆) the algorithm proceeds as follows. If k− |F | is
at most γ, where γ is the constant mentioned below the statement of Lemma 2, we try all possible S ⊂ B of size
k − |F | and for each check the conditions of validity in polynomial time, since γ = O(1) the whole procedure
works in polynomial time as well. If k − |F | > γ , try all possible polygons Γ of the form as in Lemma 2, that is,
alternating between elements ofB and potential vertices of the Voronoi diagram of the solution, and having length
at most α
√
k where α is the constant under O in the lemma. Since a vertex of a Voronoi diagram constructed
over any subset of B is equidistant from three elements from this subset and is uniquely determined by these three
elements, there are at most |B|3 potential locations for a Voronoi diagram vertex. Therefore there are at most
|B|4α
√
k variants for Γ. We consider only these Γ which do not go out of the region defined by ∆.
For each possible Γ, we split the instance in two parts. Denote by Q the set of boxes on Γ. Let V1 (V2) be the
set of voters inside (outside) of Γ, and B1 (B2) be the set of possible boxes inside (outside) of Γ, V1 ∪ V2 = V ,
V1 ∩ V2 = ∅, B1 ∪ B2 = B. For i ∈ {1, 2}, let Fi = Q ∪ (F ∩ Bi) and let ∆i be those segments δ in ∆ such
that δF ∈ Fi. The fixed preference counts v1 and v2 for F1 and F2 respectively are defined as follows. For boxes
in F \ Q the value of v is transferred directly to v1 or v2 depending on to which part the box went. For boxes
in F ∩ Q and for any preference list σ ∈ pi(C) we guess how the value of v(f, σ) is split between v1(f, σ) and
v2(f, σ). For boxes in Q \ F we guess separately the value of v1(f, σ) and v2(f, σ).
Finally, guess how k + |Q \ F | is split between the two parts k1 and k2, k1 and k2 must be each at most 34k.
Also guess how `− w is split between `1 and `2, where w is the number of boxes in Q \ F where the target party
p wins if voters from V1 and V2 vote according to v1 and v2.
Next, we run the recursion on the state R1 = (V1, B1, `1, k1, F1, v1, ∆1 ∪ Γ) and on the state R2 = (V2,
B2, `2, k2, F2, v2, ∆2 ∪ Γ). If both R1 and R2 are reported as valid states, we return that R is valid and take
S = S1 ∪S2 ∪ (Q \F ). Otherwise, we continue to the next choice of Γ. If for all choices of Γ we do not succeed,
we return that R is not valid.
The correctness. Now we prove the correctness of the algorithm above. The proof is by induction on k. In the
base case k−|F | ≤ γ the algorithm tries all possible ways to select the ballot boxes and then checks the definition
directly. In the case k−|F | > γ, assume first that the algorithm reports a given state R = (V , B, `, k, F , v, ∆) as
valid. So for some Γ the corresponding splitting states R1 = (V1, B1, `1, k1, F1, v1, ∆1 ∪ Γ) and R2 = (V2, B2,
`2, k2, F2, v2, ∆2 ∪ Γ) are reported as valid by the algorithm, and by induction that means that they are actually
valid states since both k1 and k2 are at most 34k. Consider sets S1 ⊂ B1 \ F1 and S2 ⊂ B2 \ F2 returned by the
recursive calls, by induction S1 and S2 also satisfy Definition 3 on the validity of R1 and R2, respectively. As
before, denote S1 ∪ S2 ∪ (Q \ F ) by S. We claim that S satisfies Definition 3 for R, and therefore R is valid.
By construction of R1 and R2, k = k1 + k2 − |Q \ F |, and since S1, S2, and Q \ F are pairwise disjoint, the
size of S is indeed equal to k− |F |. Next, we show that in the election with boxes S ∪F the target party p wins in
at least ` districts of S and that the votes in districts of F are distributed according to v. The next claim shows that
for voters in each part the box where they vote is the same in the election with boxes Si ∪ Fi and in the election
with boxes S ∪ F .
Claim 3. For i ∈ {1, 2} and any voter x ∈ Vi, the closest box to x in S ∪ F belongs to Si ∪ Fi as well.
Proof. Let i = 1, the other case is analogous. Assume the contrary, there is a voter x ∈ V1 such that there is a box
b ∈ S2∪F2\Qwhich is strictly closer to x than any box in S1∪F1, since two boxes cannot be at the same distance
to x. Consider a straight line segment from x to b, since x and b lie on the different sides of Γ, the segment crosses
Γ at least once, denote any intersection point by y. Since R2 is valid, the segments of Γ lie completely inside the
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cells of Q in the Voronoi diagram of S2 ∪F2. That means that there is q ∈ Q such that y is at least as close to q as
to any other box in S2 ∪F2, including b. But then dist(x, q) ≤ dist(x, y) + dist(y, q) ≤ dist(x, y) + dist(y, b) =
dist(x, b), where the first inequality is the triangle inequality, and this contradicts the initial assumption.
By Claim 3, for each i ∈ {1, 2} and for each box in Si exactly the same set of voters votes there in the election
with boxes S ∪ F compared to the election with boxes Si ∪ Fi. It means that among the boxes in S1 and S2 the
target party p wins in exactly `1 + `2 of them. For each i ∈ {1, 2} and each box f in Fi \ Q it also holds that
exactly the same set of voters votes in f in the election with boxes S ∪ F as votes in f in the election with boxes
Si ∪ Fi. Since v(f, σ) = vi(f, σ) for any σ ∈ pi(C), the vote distribution on Fi \ Q is as desired. For each box
q ∈ Q and each σ ∈ pi(C) by construction v(q, σ) = v1(q, σ) + v2(q, σ). Since voters from V1 and V2 who vote
in q are exactly preserved, v(q, σ) is indeed equal to the number of voters with preference list σ who vote in q.
This finishes the proof that R is valid and S satisfies Definition 3.
Finally, we show that for each δ ∈ ∆, δ lies inside the cell of δF in the Voronoi diagram of S ∪ F . If δF ∈ Q,
since R1 and R2 are valid, δ lies inside the cell of δF in the Voronoi diagram of Si ∪ Fi for i ∈ {1, 2}, then no
other point in S ∪ F is closer to each point on δ than δF . If δF /∈ Q, δ is completely inside or outside of Γ, and
the same argument as in Claim 3 shows that for any point on δ the closest box is preserved, then it has to be δF ,
since δ is in ∆i for some i ∈ {1, 2}, and Ri is valid.
Towards the other direction, assume that R is valid, we show that the algorithm correctly reports the validity
of R. Consider a particular S from Definition 3, by Lemma 2 for the Voronoi diagram of S ∪ F , there exists a
polygon Γ of length O(
√
k) which is a balanced separator for S ∪F . Since the algorithm tries all polygons of this
form, it will try Γ as well, or report that R is valid earlier. When considering the polygon Γ, the algorithm will
guess the right values of k1, k2, `1, `2, and v1, v2 on the boxes of Q \ F , according to the elections on S ∪ F .The
new states R1 and R2 are valid since the elections on S ∩ F exactly induce conditions on Ri, and there exists a
valid selection of boxes Si = (S ∪F )∩Bi \Q, for each i ∈ {1, 2}. Therefore the recursive call will find Ri valid
by induction. Thus the proof of correctness is finished.
Running time analysis. Denote by T (k) the worst-case running time of our algorithm where k is the respective
parameter of the input state. If k ≤ γ, the algorithm does a brute force in polynomial time so T (k) = (n+m)O(1).
If k > γ, we try at most m4α
√
k polygons Γ, for each of them we in time at most k`n2α
√
k guess the parameters
of the new two instances k1, `1, v1 and k2, `2, v2. We run our algorithm on the two instances recursively, and in
both instances the value of the parameter is bounded by 34k, so we get the following recurrence relation,{
T (k) ≤ (n+m)β
√
kT ( 34k), k > γ
T (k) ≤ (n+m)β , k ≤ γ,
where β is some constant. Now, by applying the first upper bound until the expression under T is at most γ we get
T (k) ≤ (n+m)β
√
k(1+q+q2+...+qt)
≤ (n+m)β
√
k/(1−q) = (n+m)O(
√
k),
where q =
√
3/4 and t = dlog4/3(k/γ)e.
5 Concluding Remarks
We initiated study of a gerrymandering problem from the perspective of fine-grained and parameterized complex-
ity. Our main result is asymptotically tight algorithm with respect to parameter k, the number of opened ballot
boxes, together with a matching lower bound.
For future work, it would be interesting to investigate the complexity of finding an approximate solution for
the problem. That is the question whether there is an efficient (polynomial time) algorithm that either finds a
set of k ballot boxes such that p wins `c districts, for some constant c, or correctly decides that in no elections
with k districts the candidate p wins ` of them. Another interesting question is what happens, when we introduce
obstacles, such as lakes or hills, in the instance so that the distances are not anymore Euclidean distances in the
plane. Can we still get better than trivial mk algorithm in this case? Finally, it is also natural to impose restrictions
on sizes of districts, so they are not too disproportional.
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